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Behavior, Contracts, Organitzations and Human Resources

Code: 41982
Credits: 15
2026/2027
Degree programme Type Course
Management, Organization and Business Economics OB 0

Contact lecturer

Name :
Nour Chams
Email :
nour.chams@uab.cat

Teaching staff

Stefan Felix Hemmen Almazor
Yulia Ponomareva Minchenko
Elisa del Sordo
Ryan Federo Acosta

Teaching staff (external to UAB)

Marco Barrenechea Mendez
Thomas Woiczyk
Eduardo Rodes Mayor

Group languages

You can consult this information at the end of the document.

Prerequisites

Students should be familiarized with basic instruments of microeconomics, such as preferences, risk aversion and expected utility, technology and equilibrium analysis. Basic real analysis and algebra are instruments used in the entire module.

Objectives

This module includes several topics related to the economic analysis of the internal organization of the firm. The organization and development of the module will take into account the main learning objective of providing students with relevant economic theory to perform applied research in different fields of management.

The theories are built on economic analysis of transactions and production and focused on the design of contracts, the way that persons organize such transactions. The contract is the result of a negotiation process among the affected parties. Games and behavioral economics provide the instruments for analyzing these processes. The module analyzes repeated and non repeated games under different information situations as well as non-cooperative and cooperative games. We aslo discuss experiments in economics and behavioral economics, stressing the differences in behavior with respect to theory and also gender differences. We make special emphasis on the applications of cooperative games to the contract design. The module also analyzes how external constrains (laws and state regulation) affect the design of such contracts. 

The module emphasizes the application of the theories studied in the analyses of the human resources policies of the firms, with emphasis in firm policies regarding recruiting, training, incentives and career concens. Empirical evidence on gender discrimination and wage gaps will be discussed. Other potential applications (industrial organization, corporate finance…) are also discussed.

Furthermore, this module provides a theoretical and empirical overview of the economics of the performance measurement topic, with special focus on the most recent advances and the main areas of research in the field. Based on the fundamentals of the economic theory of production, the lectures introduce and apply alternative approaches to performance and financial performance measurement.

 

 

 

Learning outcomes

  1. Present research results to various audiences using the different media available.
  2. Master the technical and IT tools needed to carry out applied studies.
  3. Identify the relevant sources of information and their content for subsequent analysis.
  4. Develop an ethical, social and environmental commitment.
  5. Work in multidisciplinary international teams.
  6. Develop a critical and a constructive attitude to one's work and that of others.
  7. Explain and motivate the analyses, interpret the results and present all these clearly and concisely in English.
  8. Leadership and decision-taking capability.
  9. Show mastery of theory of organisations, contract theory and game theory.
  10. Further investigate behavioural economics and information economics.
  11. Investigate the design and organisational culture of the business.
  12. Study the limits of the firm and its forms of cooperation.
  13. Know efficient practices in human resources.
  14. Recognise the differences between the different theories.
  15. Identify the implementation of these theories in the real world.
  16. Further investigate their implementation and design.
  17. Enumerate and define the different criteria of business efficiency.
  18. Understand the concept of social equity and its complexity in the business environment.
  19. Interpret organisational decisions by applying criteria of business efficiency and equity.
  20. Derive implications for organisational design and culture.
  21. Discover the factors that limit the firm and its forms of cooperation.
  22. Design optimal human resource policies.
  23. Analyse the different practices and strategies in human resources from an economic perspective.
  24. Identify contributions from gender studies in the subject of research.

Contents

 


The module presents the main economic theories on the design of contracts.


Three main blocks can be distinguished. Game theory will buid the instruments used in the design of contracts. Special emphasis will be taken on cooperative game theory (Economics of contracts)  and  applications to the human resoures management (Human resources). Below are some of the main points analyzed during the module.



  1.  Static games of complete information

  2.  Dynamic games of complete information and repeated games.

  3.  Games of incomplete information

  4.  Cooperative games

  5.  Experimental methods

  6. Behavioral Economics

  7. Complete contracts under asymmetric information -Moral hazard (agency theory) -Extension.

  8. Multi-Agent contracting -Adverse Selection and Mechanism design -Moral hazard in team

  9. Implicit contracts -Theory -Relational contracts -Career concerns

  10. Incomplete contracts

  11. Informal contracts

  12. Contracts and the Law

  13. Human capital and their observability.

  14. Learning about innate abilities: A midpoint between human capital and signaling from a dynamic perspective.

  15. Human capital and firms internal organization.

  16. Motivation: The agency problem. Incentive contracts.

  17. Human resource management and performance

  18. Internal Labour Markets

  19. Unions and HRM.


 


 A detailed description of their contents can be found: http://www.mmobe.uab.cat/en/

Learning activities and methodology

Title Hours ECTS Learning outcomes
Type: Autonomous
Reading related cases and practical preparation and problem sets. 110 4.4 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Type: Guided
Lectures, discussions and case presentations 175 7 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Type: Supervised
Training and monitoring of work in progress and cases 50 2 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

The module combines theoretical lectures with practical sessions that encourage active students participation. Learning activities include interactive lectures, problem sets (some of which may require specific software to be solved), reading and critically reviewing scholarly articles, in-class experiments, and simulations. This is an interactive module, where business case preparations and in-class discussions will form the important benchmarks of progress. These discussions give students an opportunity to apply course concepts to real-world problems. 

Annotation: within the schedule set by the centre or degree programme, 15 minutes of one class will be reserved for students to evaluate their lecturers and their courses or modules through questionnaires.

Assessment

Continuous assessment activities

Title Weight Hours ECTS Learning outcomes
Assignments 40 15 0.6 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24
Content exams 50 15 0.6 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18
Paper discussions 10 10 0.4 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24

The module assessment will consist of:


- Assignments (resolution of problems, case studies). Even if cooperation is valuable, all problem set must contain only individual answers to the problems.

- Paper discussions

- Exams

This subject/module can not be evaluated by the means of a single assessment.

A student who does not complete any assessable activity is considered 'non-assessable'. Therefore, once a student participates in any component of the continuous assessment, they can no longer be classified as 'non-assessable'.

Attending the sessions is a requirement.

The module is passed when the final mark is equal or higher than five.

For this course, the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies is permitted exclusively for support tasks—such as bibliographic or information searches, text correction, idea clarification, brainstorming, and receiving feedback—unless specific instructions are provided by the instructor. Students should not use AI tools to generate complete answers, write full sections of assignments or solve exam questions. Any AI generated content must be clearly identified. Students should specify the AI tools used and include a critical reflection on how these tools influenced both the process and the final result of the activity. Lack of transparency regarding the use of AI in this assessable activity will be considered academic dishonesty and may result in a partial or total penalty on the grade for the activity, or more serious sanctions in severe cases.


The completion of assessment activities is subject to the provisions set out in this course guide and in the "Policy of the School of Economics and Business on the Detection of Irregularities during Assessment Activities", which regulates the conditions under which assessment tasks are conducted and the procedures applicable in cases where indications of irregularities are detected. Students are encouraged to consult the policy.


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Software

The program will provide the software if needed.

Course groups and languages

The information provided is provisional until November 30. After this date, you will be able to consult the language of each group through this link. To access the information, you will need to enter the course CODE

Type of teaching Group Language Semester Shift
(TEm) Theory (master) 30 English annual morning-mixed
(PLABm) Practical laboratories (master) 30 English annual morning-mixed